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Abstract
We consider a two good world where an individual i with income mi has utility function u (x, y),
where x ∈ [0,∞) and y ∈ {0, 1}. We first derive the valuation (maximum price that he is willing
to pay for the object) for good y as a function of his income. Then we consider the following
problem. Suppose good x is available in a store at a fixed price 1. Good y can be obtained in
an auction. In such a situation we show that bidding ones own valuation is an equilibrium in a
second-price auction. With risk neutral bidders and high enough incomes we derive the symmetric
equilibrium in first-price and all-pay auctions and show that revenue equivalence fails to hold. With
risk neutrality we also show that under mild restrictions, the revenue maximising reserve price is
zero for all the three auctions and the all-pay auction with zero reserve price fetches the highest
expected revenue. With low enough incomes, we show that under some restrictions, bidding ones
own valuation is a symmetric equilibrium even for first-price and all-pay auctions. Here also, the
expected revenue is the highest with all-pay auctions.
Journal of Economic Literature classification number D44
1 Introduction
In the traditional benchmark model of auctions we have the following scenario. There is one
indivisible object up for sale and there are n potential bidders. Each bidder’s valuation (maximum
price that he is willing to pay for the object), vi, is private information. In terms of demand function
the valuation, vi, can be interpreted in the following way. Let p be the price of the indivisible object.
Then, the demand for the indivisible object, D (p) is as follows.
D (p) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 if p ∈ [0, vi]
0 if p ∈ (vi,∞)
Bidder i knows his (her) own valuation but does not know others’ valuations. He (she) only knows
that ∀j 6= i, Vj lies in the interval [v, v] with a known distribution function1. Seller also does not
know any bidder’s valuation. He only knows that for all i, Vi lies in the interval [v, v] with a known
distribution function. In a standard auction the object is sold to the highest bidder. The payment
by each bidder depends on the type of auction used by the seller. There is a huge literature around
this model2. One of the most celebrated results is the revenue equivalence theorem which states
that under certain assumptions (private values, independent types, symmetry, risk neutrality and
no budget constraint), the expected revenue to the seller is same across a large class of auctions.
It may be noted that the independent private value model is based on quasilinear utility func-
tions with high enough incomes. In such a case, the demand for the indivisible good and conse-
quently, its valuation is independent of income. As a result, private information about valuations
tantamounts to private information about utility functions3.
In this paper we consider a more general class of utility functions. We consider a two good
world4 where an individual i has utility function u (x, y), where x ∈ [0,∞) and y ∈ {0, 1}. The
individual’s income is mi. This mi may be thought of as the total amount of resources (or wealth)
available to individual i. Under standard assumptions we derive valuation, v (mi), for good y as
a function of his income. This links the budget constraint with valuation. We show that bidder’s
valuation can never exceed his income. We also show that depending on the nature of the utility
1As per convention, we use capital letters to denote random variables and corresponding small letters to denote
the realised values of such variables.
2See Krishna (2010) for all the standard results around the benchmark model.
3 It does not matter whether incomes are private information or not, as long as they are high enough.
4An example would be where x is food and y is a piece of painting.
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function and the income level, the valuation can be strictly increasing, constant or even strictly
decreasing in income.
We look at the auction problem from a different angle. We assume that all individuals have
the same utility function but have different incomes. We treat incomes as types. Each individual’s
income is private information and this implies that valuations (that are functions of income) are
also private information. To the best of our knowledge, no paper till date has taken this approach.
Then we consider the following problem. Suppose good x is available in a store at a fixed price
1. One unit of the indivisible good y is sold at an auction house. The price of good y and the
winner will be determined in the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the auction game. Any individual
has the option of not participating in the auction. If he does not participate in the auction for
good y, he spends his entire income on good x and earns utility u (mi, 0). Consequently, in any
equilibrium the expected payoff to the individual will be at least u (mi, 0). In no circumstances can
a bidder with income mi pay more than mi for any good. If a bidder i were to bid more than mi
(in the auction for good y) and default, then a penalty would be imposed5. In such a framework
we analyse first-price, second-price and all-pay auctions6.
In a second price auction we first show that for any given utility function, choosing a bid equal
to valuation is a weakly dominant strategy for any bidder i with income mi (proposition 1). This
shows that the original Vickrey (1961) result is very robust to changes in the benchmark model.
Unlike the second price auction, we do not have a equilibrium existence result for first-price
and all-pay auctions for all possible income levels. As such, to analyse such auctions we need to
classify incomes into two categories. In our model we will define a critical level of income k where
k is such that mi ≤ k ⇔ u (0, 1) ≥ u (mi, 0). If all incomes are below k we say that incomes are
low enough and if all incomes are above k we say that incomes are high enough.
We first analyse risk neutral bidders with high enough incomes. We derive the symmetric
equilibrium in all the three auctions without any reserve price and show that revenue equivalence
fails to hold. More specifically, we show that the expected revenue is same with first price and
second price auctions. However, all-pay auction fetches strictly higher expected revenue than first
price auction (proposition 2). We try to explain this result by comparing the equilibria in our model
with the corresponding equilibria in the symmetric benchmark model. Thereafter, we introduce
5Che and Gale (1998) has a similar approach.
6As usual, one can show that first-price auction is outcome equivalent to Dutch auction and second-price auction
is outcome equivalent to English auction.
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reserve price and show that under mild restrictions, the revenue maximising reserve price is zero
(or no reserve price is optimal) for all the three auctions (proposition 4). This stands in contrast to
the benchmark model where the revenue maximising reserve price is typically positive and higher
than the minimum possible valuation. Moreover, among the three auctions analysed, the expected
revenue to the seller is highest in the all-pay auction with zero reserve price. Whether this is an
optimal mechanism or not remains an open question.
We next analyse bidders with low enough incomes. With no reserve price and under some
restrictions, we show that bidding ones own valuation is a symmetric equilibrium even for first-
price and all-pay auctions (propositions 5-6). The fact that bidding ones’ own valuation can be an
equilibrium even in all-pay auctions is surprising and counterintuitive. We also show that in this
case the expected revenue is the highest with all-pay auctions and lowest with second price auctions
(proposition 7). We illustrate our results with specific numerical examples.
1.1 Related Literature
It may be noted that we show for all cases vi = v (mi) ≤ mi. While this seems obvious given the
nature of our problem, it is important in the context of the literature. We draw attention to an
interesting and influential paper by Che and Gale (1998) which drops the assumption of no budget
constraint. A simplified version of their model is as follows. As before let Vi = bidder i’s valuation.
But now, in addition, each bidder is subject to an absolute budget of Wi which can be strictly less
than Vi. This situation may be possible in a more dynamic context in which a bidder is currently
financially constrained, but would like to buy if he could borrow. For example, if bidders are firms
they may face borrowing constraints. In no circumstances can a bidder with a value-budget pair
(vi, wi) pay more than wi. If a bidder i were to bid more than wi and default, then a penalty would
be imposed. Each bider’s value-budget pair (Vi,Wi) is identically and independently distributed
on [0, 1]× [0, 1]. An important result of Che and Gale (1998) is that under certain conditions the
expected revenue in the first price auction is higher than the expected revenue in the second price
auction. It may be noted that in our set-up valuations are always less than or equal to income and
consequently, we avoid analysing the type of issues dealt with by Che and Gale (1998).
Saitoh and Serizawa (2008) and Sakai (2008) analyse second price auctions on general preference
domains (that include non-quasilinear preferences) and show such auctions satisfy efficiency and
strategy-proofness. We approach the problem differently and consider a case where preferences
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are common knowledge but budgets are private information. Proposition 1, where we show that
choosing a bid equal to valuation is a weakly dominant strategy, is similar to the results derived in
Saitoh and Serizawa (2008) and Sakai (2008).
In a very recent paper Gunay, Meng and Nagelberg (2010) analyse auctions with asymmetric
bidders in the standard benchmark model and provide sufficient conditions under which the optimal
reserve price is zero (or no reserve price is optimal). We have a similar result (proposition 4) and
we show that our sufficient conditions are weaker (see the discussion after proposition 4).
Plan of the paper In section 2 we provide the model of our exercise and all the relevant notations.
Section 3 provides the equilibrium in second-price auctions. In section 4 we analyse risk-neutral
bidders with high enough incomes. Section 5 analyses equilibrium when incomes are low enough.
Lastly, the appendix gives the proofs of all the results.
2 The Model
We consider a two good world where an individual i has utility function u (x, y) where x ∈ [0,∞)
and y ∈ {0, 1}. This means that any non-negative amount of good x can be consumed but in case
of good y there are only two choices. Either one unit of good y can be consumed or it cannot be
consumed. Individual i’s income is mi.
We provide the first set of assumptions. These assumptions impose some standard restrictions
on the utility function.
Assumption A1. u (0, 0) = 0 and for all y ∈ {0, 1} , u (x, y) is continuous in x for all x ∈ [0,∞)
and partially differentiable w.r.t. x for all x ∈ (0,∞).
Assumption A2. u (x, y) is strictly increasing in both x and y. That is, u (x, 1) > u (x, 0) for all
x ∈ [0,∞). And, for all y ∈ {0, 1} , x1 > x2 ⇔ u (x1, y) > u (x2, y).
Assumption A3. limx→∞ u (x, 0) > u (0, 1).
Note that assumptions A1- A3 imply that u (0, 0) = 0 < u (mi, 0) < u (mi, 1) for all mi > 0.
The sign of u (mi, 0) − u (0, 1) is not known. Since u (x, y) is continuous and strictly increasing
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in x and since limx→∞ u (x, 0) > u (0, 1) (see assumption A3) there exists a unique k > 0 s.t.
u (k, 0) = u (0, 1).
Hence
u (mi, 0) ≤ u (0, 1) iff mi ≤ k
Let price of x, Px = 1 and price of y be p. Hence the individual’s problem is
max
x∈[0,∞), y∈{0,1}
u (x, y) s.t. x+ py ≤ mi.
There are two possible cases. (i) mi ≤ k and (ii) mi > k.
We will now derive the valuation for good y (the maximum price that the consumer is willing
to pay for y) for each of these two cases.
2.1 Valuation for good y
Case 1 mi ≤ k ⇔ u (0, 1) ≥ u (mi, 0) .
It may be noted that if p ≤ mi and the individual purchases7 y he can spend mi − p on x and
get u (mi − p, 1). If he does not purchase y and spends his entire income on x he gets u (mi, 0).
Here note that for all p ∈ (0,mi]
u (mi, 1) > u (mi − p, 1) ≥ u (0, 1) ≥ u (mi, 0)
Therefore the individual will buy good y (that is choose y = 1) iff mi − p ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ p ≤ mi.
Hence, for this case the maximum price he is willing to pay for good y (his valuation for y) is
vi = mi.
7 If p > mi then the individual cannot purchase y and he has to spend the entire income on good x and get
u (mi, 0). 5
Case 2 mi > k ⇔ u (0, 1) < u (mi, 0)
From our assumptions it follows that for each mi there exists a unique c (mi) s.t. u (c (mi) , 1) =
u (mi, 0). Clearly c (.) is strictly increasing in mi. As before, if p ≤ mi and the individual purchases
y he can spend mi − p on x and get u (mi − p, 1). If he does not purchase y and spends his entire
income on x he gets u (mi, 0). Now
u (mi − p, 1) ≥ u (c (mi) , 1) = u (mi, 0)
iff mi − p ≥ c (mi) .
Therefore the individual will buy good y (that is choose y = 1) iff mi − p ≥ c (mi) ⇐⇒ p ≤
mi − c (mi). That is, the maximum price he is willing to pay for good y (his valuation for y) is
vi = mi − c (mi).
Therefore we get that valuations are functions of income.
v (mi) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
mi if mi ≤ k
mi − c (mi) if mi > k
−−−− (1)
where c (mi) is such that u (c (mi) , 1) = u (mi, 0) .
In terms of demand function we can write that for an individual with income mi the demand
for good y is the following.
D (p,mi) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 if p ∈ [0, v (mi)]
0 if p ∈ (v (mi) ,∞)
Comment Note that when mi ∈ [0, k] (income is low enough) the valuation vi = mi is strictly
increasing in income. When mi ∈ (k,∞) (income is high enough) we claim that the valuation,
vi = mi − c (mi), may be increasing, constant or even decreasing in income. We now illustrate our
claim with some examples.
Example 1: Suppose utility is quasilinear in x. That is, u (x, y) = x + uˆ (y), where uˆ (1) >
uˆ (0) = 0. Here u (0, 1) = uˆ (1) and u (mi, 0) = mi.
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Note that here k = uˆ (1) and valuation is
v (mi) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
mi if mi ≤ k = uˆ (1)
uˆ (1) if mi > k = uˆ (1)
Note that here valuation, v (mi), is constant for all mi > k. In standard auction-theory the
above utility function is used and the income is assumed to be high enough (i.e. mi > k). Incomplete
information about others’ valuation simply means incomplete information about uˆ (1). That is, for
the standard independent private value model, each bidder knows his valuation (vi = uˆi (1)) but
does not know other bidders’ valuations (vj = uˆj (1) , j 6= i). It may also be noted that since in
the benchmark model it is assumed that for all i, mi > k; it does not matter whether incomes are
private information or not (as valuations do not depend on incomes).
Example 2. Let u (x, y) = x (1 + y) + y
Note that here k = 1 and for mi ∈ (1,∞), c (mi) = mi−12 . Hence
v (mi) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
mi if mi ≤ k = 1
mi+1
2 if mi > k = 1
Here v (mi) is strictly increasing in mi for all mi.
Example 3. Let u (x, y) = x2 + y.
Note that here k = 1. Hence
v (mi) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
mi if mi ≤ k = 1
mi −
q
m2i − 1 if mi > k = 1
Here v (mi) = mi − c (mi) = mi −
q
m2i − 1 is strictly decreasing for all mi ∈ (1,∞).
2.2 Introducing incomplete information
2.2.1 The basic story
Our basic story is as follows. Let there be n individuals. All have the same preference ordering
(i.e. the same utility function) but different incomes. Bidder i’s income Mi is private knowledge
to the seller. Bidder i knows that Mi = mi but does not know Mj (j 6= i). Since valuations are
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function of incomes, private information about incomes tantamounts to private information about
valuations. Suppose good x is available at a store at price 1. One unit of good y can be obtained in
an auction. We consider three types of auctions viz. first-price, second-price and all-pay auctions.
Price of good y will be determined in the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the auction. Note that
the consumer is no longer a price-taker. His bid affects the equilibrium price of y. As noted in
the introduction, any individual has the option of not participating in the auction. If he does not
participate in the auction for good y, he spends his entire income on good x and earns utility
u (mi, 0). Consequently, in any equilibrium, the expected payoff to the individual will be at least
u (mi, 0). In no circumstances can a bidder with income mi pay more than mi for any good. If a
bidder i were to bid more than mi (in the auction for good y) and default, then a penalty, γ (where
γ > 0), would be imposed. If he defaults he cannot obtain good y (even if his bid is the highest).
In case the penalty amount exceeds his income, he has to forfeit his income. That is, in case of
default, his total payment would be min {γ,mi}. If he participates in the auction and makes a
payment Pi he spends the remaining amount, mi − Pi, on good x.
We now provide our next set of assumptions.
Assumption B1. Independent types: M1....Mn are independently distributed.
Assumption B2. Symmetry: Each random variable Mi ∈ [α, β], where α ≥ 0, has the same
distribution function F (.) and associated strictly positive density f(.). That is, each bidder i
believes that competitors’ incomes are given by Mj ∈ [α, β] with distribution function F (.) and
density function f(.).
Under assumptions A1-A3 and B1-B2 we will analyse three types of auctions viz (i) first-price
auction (ii) second price auction and (iii) all-pay auctions.
Let r be the reserve price. In any such auction the set of actions available for any bidder is
[r,∞)∪{No} where {No} means that the bidder has the option of not participating in the auction.
Individual i’s problem is to choose a strategy bi (mi) : [α, β] −→ [r,∞) ∪ {No} so as to maximise
exp. u (x, y).
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remark 1 In first price and all-pay auctions, for any bidder with income mi, choosing {No} weakly
dominates any bid bi > mi. For all-pay auctions this is obvious as the bidder has to pay his bid
regardless of whether he wins or loses in the auction. For first price auction, the reason is as
follows. If the bidder chooses {No} he gets utility u (mi, 0). If he chooses a bid bi > mi and if his
bid is the highest he has to default and pay min {γ,mi}. Note that he cannot obtain good y if he
defaults. Let Pw be the probability of win if he chooses bid bi > mi. In this case, his expected payoff
is Pwu (mi −min {γ,mi} , 0)+ (1− Pw)u (mi, 0). Note that for any Pw ∈ [0, 1] this expected payoff
is less than or equal to u (mi, 0) (with strict inequality when Pw > 0). This implies that it is always
better for him to choose {No} than to choose any bid bi > mi. This means in first price or all-pay
auctions no bidder will choose a bid higher than his income. We will later show that for second
price auctions choosing a bid bi = v (mi) weakly dominates any other bid. Since for all mi ∈ [α, β]
we have v (mi) ≤ mi, bidders’ bids will be below their incomes in second price auctions.
Before giving our main results we need to provide some preliminaries on order statistics.
2.3 Order Statistics : some notations and preliminaries
Let M1,M2..Mn denote a random sample of size n drawn from F (.). Then M(1) ≥ M(2)... ≥ M(n)
where M(i)s are Mis arranged in decreasing magnitudes, are defined to be the order statistics
corresponding to the random sample M1,M2..Mn.
We would be interested inM(1) (highest order statistic) andM(2) (second highest order statistic).
The corresponding distribution functions and density functions are F1(.), F2(.) and f1(.), f2(.).
Note that
F1(z) = F
n(z) and F2(z) = Fn (z) + n
£
Fn−1 (z)− Fn (z)
¤
f1(z) = nFn−1 (z) f (z) and f2(z) = n (n− 1)Fn−2 [1− F (z)] f (z)
Another useful random variable is T = max {M2,M3...Mn}. To any individual this is the maximum
of the others’ incomes. The distribution and density function of T is G (.) and g (.) respectively.
Clearly
G (t) = Fn−1 (t)
g (t) = (n− 1)Fn−2 (t) f (t)
We will be using these notations frequently in our proofs.
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3 Equilibrium in second price auctions
We first analyse second price auction. The result is identical to the standard result in auction
theory.
Proposition 1 If r = 0 then in a second-price auction for any mi ∈ [α, β] it’s a weakly dominant
strategy for bidder i to bid his own valuation. That is, the following is a symmetric Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of the second price auction.
bII (mi) = v (mi) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
mi if mi ≤ k
mi − c (mi) if mi > k
.
Comment Irrespective of the nature of utility function and the level of incomes, bidding one’s
own valuation is a weakly dominant strategy in a second price auction. This shows that the original
result of Vickrey (1961) on second price auction is very robust to changes in model specifications. As
noted in the introduction, Proposition 1 is similar to result derived in Saitoh and Serizawa (2008)
and Sakai (2008) that deal with second price auctions on general preference domains (including
non-quasilinear preferences) and show such auctions satisfy efficiency and strategy-proofness.
Unlike second price auctions, we do not have a equilibrium existence result for first-price and
all-pay auctions for all possible income levels. Consequently, to analyse such auctions we classify
incomes into two categories.
High enough and low enough incomes We take k as a critical benchmark of the level of
incomes. If β < k (that is, all incomes are below k) then we say that incomes are low enough. If
α ≥ k (that is, all incomes are above k) we say that incomes are high enough.
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4 Risk neutral bidders with high enough incomes
We now consider the following class of utility functions where the individual is risk neutral and
incomes are high enough. In our framework an individual would be risk neutral iff ∂
2
∂x2u (x, y) = 0.
For an explanation about why this is so see Kreps (1990, chapter 3)8.
It is clear, that, to be consistent with our assumptions, we need a utility function of the following
type.
u (x, y) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
wx if y = 0
qx+ s if y = 1
−−−− (2) ,
where q ≥ w > 0 and s > 0.
Note that here u (mi, 0) = wmi and u (0, 1) = s. We now explain as to why we need q ≥ w > 0 and
s > 0. First note that if q < w then for large enough x we get u (x, 0) = wx > qx+ s = u (x, 1) and
this violates assumption A2. If s = 0 then u (0, 1) = 0 = u (0, 0) and this also violates assumption
A2.
For this utility function k = sw and hence from (1) we have
v (mi) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
mi if mi ≤ sw
(q−w)mi+s
q if mi >
s
w
Note that if q = w then for all mi > sw the valuations are constant and v (mi) =
s
w and we are
back to the quasi-linear case of standard benchmark model (similar to example 1). Note that in the
benchmark model each individual has a different sw
³
say siwi
´
and each siwi is private information.
For this particular case, since the individual i’s valuation vi (mi) = siwi is independent of income (for
high enough incomes i.e. for mi > siwi ); it does not matter whether incomes are private information
or not.
Since we do not consider the quasi-linear utility function we will assume that q > w . This
means valuations are strictly increasing in incomes for all mi. And let α ≥ k = sw . This implies
that all incomes are high enough.
8Proposition 3.6 of Kreps (1990) shows that under some standard assumptions the indirect utility function is the
von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility functiom for income. Kreps (1990) also shows that the same result goes through
if additionally, there is uncertainty over prices. It follows that if the indirect utlity function linear in income then the
individual is risk neutral. In our model the indirect utlity function will be linear in income iff ∂
2
∂x2 u (x, y) = 0.
4.1 Symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium without any reserve price
We now compute the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria for first-price, second-price and all-pay
auctions without any reserve price when all incomes are high enough.
4.1.1 First price auction
Let bI (mi), which is strictly increasing in mi be the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the
first-price auction. Let bidders 2, 3..n choose bI (m2) , bI (m3) , ...bI (mn) and let bidder 1 choose a
bid b1. Note that b1 ∈
£
bI (α) , bI (β)
¤
. Since bI (.) is strictly increasing there exists a z ∈ [α, β]
such that b1 = bI (z). Then the probability that 1 wins is
Prob.
¡
b1 > max
©
bI (m2) , b
I (m3) , ...b
I (mn)
ª¢
= Prob.
¡
bI (z) > max
©
bI (m2) , bI (m3) , ...bI (mn)
ª¢
= Prob. (z > max {m2,m3, ...mn})
= G (z) (see section 2.3 for the relevant notations)
Note that if 1 wins he pays bI (z) to obtain good y and can spend the rest i.e. m1−bI (z) on good x
(whose price is unity). From (2) we get that conditional on winning, his payoff is q
¡
m1 − bI (z)
¢
+s.
If he does not win the auction he spends his entire income on good x and earns a payoff wm1. Hence
bidder 1’s expected payoff by bidding bI (z) is
π1 (z,m1) = G (z)
£
q
¡
m1 − bI (z)
¢
+ s
¤
+ (1−G (z))wm1
= G (z)
£
(q − w)m1 + s− qbI (z)
¤
+ wm1.
Now for bI (m1) to be the equilibrium bid chosen by bidder 1 we need that
∂π1 (.)
∂z
= g (z)
£
(q − w)m1 + s− qbI (z)
¤
− qG (z) db
I (z)
dz
= 0 at z = m1.
That is,
g (m1)
£
(q − w)m1 + s− qbI (m1)
¤
− qG (m1)
dbI (m1)
dm1
= 0−−−− (3) .
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Hence bI (m1) solves the following differential equation (4) and the boundary condition (4a).
dbI
dm1
=
g (m1)
£
(q − w)m1 + s− qbI
¤
qG (m1)
−−−− (4)
bI (α) = v (α) =
(q −w)α+ s
q
−−−− (4a) .
To get the exact functional form of bI (m) we proceed as follows. Note that
d
dz
£
G (z)
£
(q − w) z + s− qbI (z)
¤¤
= g (z)
£
(q −w)m1 + s− qbI (z)
¤
+G (z)
∙
(q − w)− qdb
I (z)
dz
¸
= (q − w)G (z) (using (3)).
Since G (α) = 0 we have
G (z)
£
(q − w) z + s− qbI (z)
¤
=
Z z
α
(q − w)G (t) dt
⇒ bI (z) = 1
q
∙
(q − w) z + s− (q − w)
G (z)
Z z
α
G (t) dt
¸
.
From section 2.3 we know that G (.) = Fn−1 (.). Hence
bI (m) =
1
q
∙
(q − w)m+ s− (q − w)
Fn−1 (m)
Z z
α
Fn−1 (t) dt
¸
.
4.1.2 Second-price auction
From proposition 1 we know that when α ≥ k = sq the following constitutes a symmetric Bayesian
Nash equilibrium in the second price auction.
bII (m) =
(q −w)m+ s
q
4.1.3 All-Pay auction
Let bAP (mi), which is strictly increasing in mi be the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the
all-pay auction. Let bidders 2, 3..n choose bAP (m2) , bAP (m3) , ...bAP (mn) and as before let bidder
1 choose a bid b1 = bAP (z). Consequently, as before the probability that 1 wins is G (z).
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Note that in an all-pay auction bidder 1 pays bAP (z) irrespective of whether he wins or loses. If
1 wins he pays bAP (z) to obtain good y and can spend the rest i.e. m1− bAP (z) on good x (whose
price is unity). Conditional on winning, his payoff is q
¡
m1 − bAP (z)
¢
+ s. If he looses he does not
obtain good y but still pays bAP (z) and earns a payoff equal to w
¡
m1 − bAP (z)
¢
. Hence, bidder
1’s expected payoff when he bids bAP (z) is
π1 (z,m1) = G (z)
£
q
¡
m1 − bAP (z)
¢
+ s
¤
+ (1−G (z))w
¡
m1 − bAP (z)
¢
= G (z)
£
(q − w)
¡
m1 − bAP (z)
¢
+ s
¤
+ w
¡
m1 − bAP (z)
¢
.
Now for bAP (m1) to be the equilibrium bid chosen by bidder 1 we need that
∂π1 (.)
∂z
= g (z)
£
(q − w)
¡
m1 − bAP (z)
¢
+ s
¤
− (q − w)G (z) db
AP (z)
dz
− wdb
AP (z)
dz
= 0 at z = m1.
That is,
g (m1)
£
(q − w)
¡
m1 − bAP (m1)
¢
+ s
¤
− (q − w)G (m1)
dbAP (m1)
dm1
− wdb
AP (m1)
dm1
= 0−−−− (5)
Note that in a symmetric equilibrium bAP (α) = 0. The reason is that any bidder whose income is
α wins with probability zero in a symmetric increasing equilibrium. Since it’s an all-pay auction
he should bid zero and pay zero. Hence bAP (m1) solves the following differential equation (6) and
the boundary condition (6a).
dbAP
dm
=
g (m1)
£
(q − w)
¡
m1 − bAP
¢
+ s
¤
G (m1) q + (1−G (m1))w
−−−− (6)
bAP (α) = 0−−−− (6a) .
To get the exact functional form of bAP (m) we proceed as follows. Note that
d
dz
£
G (z)
£
(q − w)
¡
z − bAP (z)
¢
+ s
¤
+ w
¡
z − bAP (z)
¢¤
= g (z)
£
(q − w)
¡
z − bAP (z)
¢
+ s
¤
+ (q − w)G (z)
µ
1− db
AP (z)
dz
¶
+w
µ
1− db
AP (z)
dz
¶
= (q −w)G (z) + w (using 5)
Since G (α) = 0 and bAP (α) = 0 we get that
G (z)
£
(q − w)
¡
z − bAP (z)
¢
+ s
¤
+ w
¡
z − bAP (z)
¢
= wα+
Z z
α
[(q − w)G (t) +w] dt.
= wz + (q − w)
Z z
α
G (t) dt.
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Noting that G (.) = Fn−1 (.) from above we get
bAP (m) =
Fn−1 (m) [(q − w)m+ s]− (q −w)
Rm
α F
n−1 (t) dt
Fn−1 (m) q + (1− Fn−1 (m))w .
remark 2 The derivations of bI (.) and bAP (.) are only heuristic because both (1) and (3) are
necessary conditions. We have not formally established that if the other (n− 1) bidders follow bI (.)
or bAP (.) then it is indeed optimal for a bidder with income m to bid bI (m) or bAP (m). It is
straightforward to show this and such demonstration is available from the author on request.
4.1.4 Expected revenues without any reserve price
The expected revenue in the three auctions (without any reserve price) are as follows.
First-price : RI =
Z β
α
bI (m) f1 (m) dm
Second-price : RII =
Z β
α
bII (m) f2 (m) dm
All-pay : RAP = n
Z β
α
bAP (m) f (m) dm
We now provide our next main result which shows that revenue equivalence breaks down even with
risk neutrality.
Proposition 2 When bidders are risk neutral and incomes are high enough (i.e. α ≥ k = sw ) then
RAP > RI = RII .
Comment With risk neutral bidders, the expected revenue is same in first-price and second-price
auctions for high enough incomes. Surprisingly however, this does not extend to all-pay auctions.
This stands in stark contrast to the benchmark model where the expected revenue is same for all
three auctions analysed here. We now provide a direct comparison of our result with the benchmark
model and provide a plausible explanation behind proposition 2.
Note that the lowest possible valuation is v (α) = (q−w)α+sq and the highest possible valuation
is v (β) = (q−w)β+sq . Let v (α) = v and v (β) = v¯. Now consider random variables vi = v (mi).
Since Mis are i.i.d over [α, β] with distribution function F (.) and density function f (.), therefore
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vis are i.i.d over [v, v¯] with distribution function FV (t) = F
³
qt−s
q−w
´
and density function fV (t) =
q−w
q f
³
qt−s
q−w
´
.
Consider any arbitrary bidder with income m. Let v (m) = ρ and this implies m = v−1 (ρ) =
qρ−s
q−w . Now consider a standard auction in the benchmark model where valuations, vis, are i.i.d.
over [v, v¯] with distribution function FV (.) and density function fV (.).
In a second price auction of the benchmark model a bidder with valuation ρ would bid ρ and the
corresponding bidder in our auction (whose income is m) would bid v (m) = ρ. We now show that
the bidding behaviour in first price auction is exactly the same in our model and the benchmark
model.
Let in equilibrium a bidder with valuation ρ bid BI (ρ) in the benchmark model. We know
that9
BI (ρ) = ρ−
Z ρ
v
Fn−1V (t)
Fn−1V (ρ)
dt.
Note that Fn−1V (ρ) = F
n−1
³
qρ−s
q−w
´
= Fn−1 (m)
³
since ρ = v (m) = (q−w)m+sq
´
. Also note that
v−1 (t) = qt−sq−w and v
−10 (t) = qq−w . HenceZ ρ
v
Fn−1V (t) dt =
µ
q − w
q
¶µ
q
q − w
¶Z ρ
v
Fn−1
µ
qt− s
q − w
¶
dt
=
µ
q − w
q
¶Z ρ
v
v−10 (t)Fn−1
¡
v−1 (t)
¢
dt
=
µ
q − w
q
¶Z v−1(ρ)
v−1(v)
Fn−1 (t) dt
=
µ
q − w
q
¶Z m
α
Fn−1 (t) dt.
This implies
BI (ρ) = v (m)−
µ
q − w
q
¶µ
1
Fn−1 (m)
¶Z m
α
Fn−1 (t) dt.
=
(q −w)m+ s
q
−
µ
q −w
q
¶µ
1
Fn−1 (m)
¶Z m
α
Fn−1 (t) dt.
= bI (m) .
This means that a corresponding bidder whose income is m (where v (m) = ρ) in our model bids
exactly the same as he would have under the benchmark model. Since in the benchmark model the
expected revenue in first price auction is the same as in second price auction, the same result must
go through in our model also.
9See chapter 2 of Krishna (2010).
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However, now we show that in our model a bidder bids higher in all-pay auction as compared
to the corresponding bidder in the benchmark model and this implies that the expected revenue
with all-pay auction is higher in our model and revenue equivalence breaks down.
In a symmetric equilibrium in all pay auction under the benchmark model a bidder with valu-
ation ρ bids BAP (ρ) where10
BAP (ρ) = Fn−1V (ρ) ρ−
Z ρ
v
Fn−1v (t) dt.
From the derivations before we getZ ρ
v
Fn−1v (t) dt =
µ
q − w
q
¶Z m
α
Fn−1 (t) dt.
We know that ρ = v (m) and this means
Fn−1V (ρ) = F
n−1
µ
qρ− s
q − w
¶
= Fn−1 (m)
Hence
BAP (ρ) = Fn−1 (m) v (m)−
µ
q − w
q
¶Z m
α
Fn−1 (t) dt.
= Fn−1 (m)
(q − w)m+ s
q
−
µ
q − w
q
¶Z m
α
Fn−1 (t) dt.
Note that for all m ∈ [α, β) we have Fn−1 (m) q +
¡
1− Fn−1 (m)
¢
w < q. Hence, in our model we
have
bAP (m) =
Fn−1 (m) [(q − w)m+ s]− (q − w)
Rm
α F
n−1 (t) dt
Fn−1 (m) q + (1− Fn−1 (m))w
>
Fn−1 (m) [(q − w)m+ s]− (q − w)
Rm
α F
n−1 (t) dt
q
for all m ∈ (α, β)
= BAP (ρ) .
This clearly shows that in an all-pay auction a bidder with income m in our model would bid
higher than the corresponding bidder with valuation ρ (where ρ = v (m)) in the benchmark model.
This implies that the expected revenue in all-pay auction would be higher in our model than in
the benchmark model. Since in the benchmark model the expected revenue from all-pay auction is
the same as in first price or second price auctions, in our model the expected revenue from all-pay
auction is higher than either first price or second price auctions.
10See chapter 3 of Krishna (2010).
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We now illustrate proposition 2 with an example.
Example 4 Let u (x, y) = x (1 + y) + y
Here q = 2, w = 1 and s = 1. Let α = 1, β = 2 and let F (.) be uniform on [1, 2]. Here k = 1
and u (mi, 0) ≥ u (0, 1) for all mi ∈ [1, 2].
Routine computation shows that c (mi) = mi−12 and hence (see (1)) we have v (mi) = mi −
c (mi) =
mi+1
2 . We also have the following.
bI (m) =
m+ 3
4
, bII (m) =
m+ 1
2
and bAP (m) =
1
2
m− 3
2m
+ 1.
The expected revenues are as follows.
RI =
7
6
= 1. 166 7
RII =
7
6
= 1. 166 7
RAP =
7
2
− 3 ln 2 = 1. 420 6.
Clearly all-pay auction fetches more revenue and the revenue equivalence breaks down even with
risk neutral bidders.
4.2 Introducing reserve prices in the risk neutral case
Let the auctioneer impose a reserve price r. This means that bids below r are not acceptable.
As before we take α ≥ k = sw (all incomes are high enough). This implies at for all mi ∈ [α, β],
v (mi) =
(q−w)mi+s
q . It may be noted that without any reserve price we had b
I (α) = v (α),
bII (α) = v (α) and βAP (α) = 0. Consequently, any reserve price, r, such that 0 < r < v (α) will
have no impact on bidding equilibrium in first-price and second price auctions. However, such a
r will affect the equilibrium in all-pay auctions. Also note that, if r > v (β) then in any auction
the best action for any bidder is to choose {No} (that is, not participate in the auction for good y
and spend the entire income on good x). Hence, we restrict our attention to r ∈ [0, v (β)]. We give
below the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium for all the three auctions when the seller imposes
a positive reserve price r. The computation of such equilibria are straightforward.
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4.2.1 First-Price auction
If r ∈ [0, v (a)) then for all m ∈ [α, β]
bI (m) =
1
q
∙
(q −w)m+ s− q − w
Fn−1 (m)
Z m
α
Fn−1 (t) dt
¸
for all m ∈ [α, β] .
If r ∈ [v (α) , v (β)] then
bI (m) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
{No} if m ∈
h
α, qr−sq−w
´
1
q
h
(q − w)m+ s− q−wFn−1(m)
Rm
qr−s
q−w
Fn−1 (t) dt
i
if m ∈
h
qr−s
q−w , β
i
.
4.2.2 Second-Price auction
If r ∈ [0, v (a)) then for all m ∈ [α, β]
bII (m) =
1
q
[(q − w)m+ s] for all m ∈ [α, β] .
If r ∈ [v (α) , v (β)] then
bII (m) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
{No} if m ∈
h
α, qr−sq−w
´
(q−w)m+s
q if m ∈
h
qr−s
q−w , β
i
.
Comment As noted before, any r ∈ [0, v (a)) does not affect the bidding strategy in both first
price and second price auctions. If r ∈ [v (α) , v (β)] then in both auctions a bidder whose income
is v−1 (r) = qr−sq−w will be indifferent between bidding and not bidding.
4.2.3 All-pay auction
Let r ∈ [0, ∞) and let in a symmetric equilibrium µ be the level of income (which depends on r)
such that a bidder with income µ is indifferent between bidding and not bidding. If the bidder with
income µ chooses not to bid (that is, he selects {No}) then he spends his entire income on good x
and gets utility wµ. If he bids, he must bid the lowest admissible amount which is r. If he bids r
then the probability that he wins in a symmetric equilibrium is Fn−1 (µ), the probability that all
other incomes are less than µ. His expected payoff is then
Fn−1 (µ) [q (µ− r) + s] +
¡
1− Fn−1 (µ)
¢
w (µ− r)
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The above must be equal to wµ, since he is indifferent between bidding and not bidding. That is,
we have
Fn−1 (µ) [q (µ− r) + s] +
¡
1− Fn−1 (µ)
¢
w (µ− r) = wµ
This implies
Fn−1 (µ) [(q − w) (µ− r) + s] = wr.
We can now easily compute that if r ∈ [0, v (β)] then
bAP (m) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
{No} if m ∈ [α, µ)
Fn−1(m)[(q−w)m+s]−(q−w)
?m
µ F
n−1(t)dt
Fn−1(m)q+(1−Fn−1(m))w if m ∈ [µ, β]
where µ is s.t. Fn−1 (µ) [(q − w) (µ− r) + s] = wr.
4.2.4 Expected revenues with a reserve price
We now deduce the expected revenue going to the seller for each of the three auctions with a reserve
price r. In a first price auction the expected payment of a bidder with income m ≥ qr−sq−w is
P I (m, r) = (Prob. win)× bI (m)
= Fn−1 (m)× bI (m) .
= Fn−1 (m)
(q − w)m+ s
q
− q − w
q
Z m
qr−s
q−w
Fn−1 (t) dt
Similarly in a second price auction the expected payment of a bidder with income m = qr−sq−w is
rFn−1
³
qr−s
q−w
´
and the expected payment of a bidder with income m > qr−sq−w is
P II (m, r) = rFn−1
µ
qr − s
q − w
¶
+
Z m
qr−s
q−w
(q − w) z + s
q
dFn−1 (z)
In an all-pay auction the expected payment of a bidder with income m ≥ µ is just bAP (m).
That is,
PAP (m, r) =
Fn−1 (m) [(q − w)m+ s]− (q −w)
Rm
µ F
n−1 (t) dt
Fn−1 (m) q + (1− Fn−1 (m))w .
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The expected revenues are as follows.
First-Price Auction:
RI (r) = n
Z β
qr−s
q−w
P I (m, r) f (m) dm
Second-Price Auction:
RII (r) = n
Z β
qr−s
q−w
P II (m, r) f (m) dm
All-Pay Auction:
RAP (r) = n
Z β
µ
PAP (m, r) f (m) dm
where µ is s.t. Fn−1 (µ) [(q − w) (µ− r) + s] = wr.
We now provide our next set of main results that compare expected revenues.
Proposition 3 RI (r) = RII (r) for all r ∈ [0, v (β)] .
Comment Like the case of no reserve price, in both second price and first price auctions, one
can show that with reserve price r, the bidders’ equilibrium bids would be exactly the same in our
model as they would have in the benchmark model. Since in the symmetric benchmark model, for
any reserve price the expected revenue is same in first price and second price auctions, the same
holds true for our model as well. However, for any arbitrary r, we cannot compare expected revenue
in all-pay auction and first-price auction. We show this in terms of an example.
Example 5 We take the same specification as example 4. That is we have the following.
u (x, y) = x (1 + y) + y.Here q = 2, w = 1 and s = 1. Let α = 1, β = 2 and F (.) is uniform
on [1, 2]. Here k = 1 and and hence vi = mi − c (mi) = mi+12 . Here v (α) = 1 and v (β) = 1.5.
If r > 1.5 then all bidders will choose {No} in any of the three auctions. If r ∈ [0, 1) bidding
strategies do not change in either first price or second price auctions.
Routine computation shows the following. If r ∈ [1, 1.5] then
bI (m) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
{No} if m ∈ [1, 2r − 1)
1
2m+
1
2(m−1)
¡
−12m2 +m+ 2r2 − 4r +
3
2
¢
+ 12 if m ∈ [2r − 1, 2] .
and
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bII (m) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
{No} if m ∈ [1, 2r − 1)
m+1
2 if m ∈ [2r − 1, 2]
.
For all pay auction we have the following. If r ∈ [0, 1.5] then µ = 12r +
1
2
√
r2 + 4 and
bAP (m) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
{No} if m ∈
h
1, 12r +
1
2
√
r2 + 4
´
1
m
⎛
⎝ m−
1
2r +
1
4r
√
r2 + 4 + (m− 1) (m+ 1)
−12
√
r2 + 4− 12m2 +
1
4r
2 + 12
⎞
⎠ if m ∈
h
1
2r +
1
2
√
r2 + 4, 2
i
The expected revenues in first-price and all-pay auctions are as follows.
RI (r) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1.1667 if r ∈ [0, 1]
−163 r3 + 14r2 − 12r +
9
2 if r ∈ (1, 1.5]
0 if r ∈ (1.5,∞) .
RAR (r) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
R 2
1
2
r+1
2
√
r2+4
³
m− 1mr −
1
m
√
r2 + 4 + 12mr
2 − 1m +
1
2mr
√
r2 + 4 + 2
´
dm if r ∈ [0, 1.5]
0 if r ∈ (1.5,∞) .
We plot RI (r) (bold line) and RAR (r) (dash line) below.
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
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1.2
1.4
reserve price
exp. revenue
Expected revenue in first price (bold line) and all-pay (dash line) auctions
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The above shows that in our example if r ∈ [0.739] expected revenue under all-pay auction
is higher than under first-price auction and the opposite is true when r ∈ [0.739, 1.5]. Hence we
cannot have a general revenue ranking for all r. It may be noted that in our example, all-pay
auctions with zero reserve price fetches the highest revenue among the three auctions analysed. We
later show that under some mild restrictions this is always true.
Optimal reserve price We next compute the optimal reserve price in each of these auctions.
Let
r∗ (FPA) = argmax
r≥0
RI (r)
r∗ (SPA) = argmax
r≥0
RII (r)
and r∗ (APA) = argmax
r≥0
RAP (r) .
Note that proposition 3 clearly shows that the optimum reserve price will be the same in first-price
and second price auction. That is, r∗ (FPA) = r∗ (SPA). We now provide our next main result
on optimal reserve prices.
Proposition 4 If the hazard rate f(.)1−F (.) is non-decreasing and if f (α) ≥
q−w
(q−w)α+s then
r∗ (FPA) = r∗ (SPA) = r∗ (APA) = 0.
Comment From proposition 2 we know that RAP (0) > RI (0) = RII (0). Consequently, from
the seller’s viewpoint the all pay auction with zero reserve price (or no reserve price) is the best.
This stands in contrast to the standard symmetric benchmark model of auctions. Whether or not
this is the optimal mechanism in this context remains an open question.
It may also be noted that non-decreasing hazard rate is a very standard assumption in the
benchmark auction model. Note that higher is α (the minimum possible income) or higher is
s = u (0, 1) the lower is q−w(q−w)α+s and the inequality f (α) ≥
q−w
(q−w)α+s is more likely to be satisfied.
As such, we can intuitively say that either if all incomes are very high or if u (0, 1) is very high then
the optimal reserve price will always be zero.
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It may be noted that in the benchmark model the revenue maximising reserve price is generally
positive and above v (the minimum possible valuation, which is v (α) in our model). As noted in
the introduction, recently Gunay, Meng and Nagelberg (2010) analyse reserve prices when bidders
are asymmetric. They provide sufficient conditions under which the optimal reserve price is zero.
In a symmetric setting their conditions would be the following (see the discussion after proposition
2 in our paper for the notations).
f 0V (.) ≥ 0 and fV (v) ≥
1
v
.
Although our model is different, we show that our sufficient conditions are weaker than Gunay,
Meng and Nagelberg (2010). Note that fV (v) =
q−w
q f
³
qv−s
q−w
´
= q−wq f (α) since v = v (α) =
(q−w)α+s
q .Now
fV (v) >
1
v
⇔ q −w
q
f (α) >
1
v (α)
⇔ f (α) >
µ
q
q − w
¶µ
q
(q −w)α+ s
¶
Now RHS >
µ
q − w
q
¶µ
q
(q − w)α+ s
¶
=
q − w
(q − w)α+ s .
Hence fV (v) >
1
v
⇒ f (α) > q − w
(q − w)α+ s .
Also, f 0V (.) ≥ 0 ⇔ f 0 (.) ≥ 0 and f 0 (.) ≥ 0 implies that the hazard rate
f(.)
1−F (.) is non-decreasing.
Since we need the hazard rate to be non-decreasing and f (α) ≥ q−w(q−w)α+s our sufficient conditions
are weaker than the sufficient conditions required in Gunay, Meng and Nagelberg (2010).
5 Symmetric Equilibria with low enough incomes
The previous section dealt with risk neutral bidders with high enough incomes. We now turn our
attention to the case where bidders’ incomes are low enough (i.e. β < k) and there is no reserve
price. In this section we allow for general preferences (that include risk neutrality).
Since β < k we have mi < k for all i and from (1) we know that v (mi) = mi for all i. We also
know from proposition 1 that in a second price auction the symmetric equilibrium will be given by
bII (mi) = mi. We now analyse symmetric equilibria in first-price and all-pay auctions and show
that under some restrictions all bidders bidding their valuations is a symmetric Bayesian Nash
equilibrium even for these auctions.
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Let us denote the marginal utility of x by the following.
MUx (x, y) =
∂u (x, y)
∂x
= u0 (x, y) (this is an abuse of notation).
We now proceed to our next two results.
Proposition 5 If the reverse hazard rate f(.)F (.) is non-increasing and if for all x ∈ [0, β]
u0 (x, 1) ≤ (n− 1) f (β) [u (0, 1)− u (β, 0)]
then bI (mi) = mi is a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a first price auction.
Proposition 6 If α = 0 and if ∀mi ∈ [0, β]
Fn−1 (mi)u (0, 1) ≥ u (mi, 0)
and Fn−1 (mi)u (0, 1) ≥ Fn−1 (mi − ε)u (ε, 1) +
¡
1− Fn−1 (mi − ε)
¢
u (ε, 0) , ∀ε ∈ (0,mi) .
then bAP (mi) = mi is a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium in an all-pay auction.
The expected revenues in this case are as follows.
First-price : RI =
Z β
0
zf1 (z) dz,
Second-price : RII =
Z β
0
zf2 (z) dz
All-Pay : RAP = n
Z β
0
zf (z) dz
We now provide the revenue ranking result for the case when incomes are low enough.
Proposition 7 If all the conditions of propositions 5 and 6 hold then RAP > RI > RII .
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Comment As noted in the introduction, in Che and Gale (1998) an individual’s income may be
strictly less than his valuation for the auction good. Che and Gale (1998) show that it is possible
to have a symmetric equilibrium in a first price auction where bids are equal to incomes and the
expected revenue in first price auctions will be strictly higher than the expected revenue in second
price auctions. In our model, when incomes are low enough, valuations are exactly equal to incomes
(see (1)). We have shown that bidders bid their valuations in a symmetric equilibrium first price
auctions (proposition 5). This, together with the fact that RI > RII (proposition 7) is somewhat
close in spirit to Che and Gale (1998).
We have also shown that even for all pay auctions it is possible to have a symmetric equilibrium
where bidders bid their valuations (proposition 6). This result is surprising and has not been
demonstrated before. In a nutshell, when bidders’ incomes are low enough, revenue equivalence
fails to hold and all-pay auction fetches the highest expected revenue.
We now provide three simple examples to illustrate propositions 5-7. The purpose is twofold.
1. Firstly, the examples show that it is possible to have utility functions and distribution func-
tions that satisfy all conditions of propositions 5 and 6.
2. Secondly, the examples demonstrate that conditions of propositions 5 and 6 are consistent
with (i) risk neutrality (ii) risk aversion and (ii) risk loving.
Example 6a: Bidders are risk neutral. Let u (x, y) = x + 3y, n = 2 and let Mi be uniformly
distributed over [0, 1]. That is, F (m) = m. Note that here k = 3. RI = 23 , R
II = 13 and R
AP = 1.
Example 6b: Bidders are risk averse. Let u (x, y) = ln (1 + x) + 3y, n = 2 and let Mi be
uniformly distributed over [0, 1]. That is, F (m) = m. Note that here k = e3−1 = 19. 086. RI = 23 ,
RII = 13 and R
AP = 1.
Example 6c: Bidders are risk lovers. Let u (x, y) = x2 + 3y, n = 2 and let Mi be uniformly
distributed over [0, 1]. That is, F (m) = m. Note that here k =
√
3 = 1. 732 1. RI = 23 , R
II = 13
and RAP = 1.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper we had a re-look at the basic auction model. Unlike the benchmark model we
take a novel approach and consider a more general class of utility functions and assume that all
individuals have the same utility functions but have different incomes. We treat incomes as types.
Each individual’s income is private information and this implies that valuations (that are functions
of income) are also private information. We have shown that in two good world where one good
is available in a store at a fixed price and the other good is sold in an auction, many results of
the benchmark model do not hold. While Vickrey’s (1961) result on second price auction is very
robust, revenue equivalence breaks down even with risk-neutral bidders and high enough incomes.
We propose the following for possible future research.
1. In this paper for first-price and all-pay auctions we have dealt with either high enough incomes
(i.e. α ≥ k) or low enough incomes (i.e. β < k). We have not analysed the case when
α < k < β. Derivation of equilibrium in first price auctions and all-pay auctions, effects
of reserve price and revenue ranking results when α < k < β should be an interesting (and
challenging) future course of research.
2. It would be interesting to compute the expected revenue maximising optimal mechanisms in
our model.
3. It would also be interesting to explore the possible equilibria and revenue ranking when
bidders are risk averse with high enough incomes.
We believe there is ample scope for further research into this area.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 We know that
v (mi) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
mi if mi ≤ k
mi − c (mi) if mi > k
where c (mi) is such that u (c (mi) , 1) = u (mi, 0) .
Let’s consider bidder 1 whose income is m1. Let z be the maximum of the others’ bids. Let
player 1 bid b1. There are two possible cases (i) m1 ≤ k and (ii) m1 > k.
Case 1 m1 ≤ k. This means v (m1) = m1. For this case there are three possible subcases.
Subcase (i) z > m1. If 1 chooses b1 = m1 he gets a payoff equal to u (m1, 0) (as he looses in
the auction and spends his entire income on good x). Any b1 < z will give him the same payoff. If
he bid b1 ≥ z he wins with a positive probability. Note that if b1 > z he wins with certainty and
if b1 = z there is a tie and his probability of winning is same as the probability of winning the tie.
Since z > m1 bidder 1 cannot pay for the object after winning it. This means he will default and
he has to pay a positive penalty. Hence for this subcase b1 = m1 is the best.
Subcase (ii) z < m1. Choosing a bid b1 = m1 gives player 1 a payoff equal to u (m1 − z, 1) (as he
wins with certainty and pays z for one unit of good y). If he chooses b1 ∈ (z,m1) he gets the same
payoff. Any bid strictly greater than m1 will also fetch him the same payoff. If he chooses b1 < z
he looses the auction and gets u (m1, 0). Since m1 ≤ k we have u (m1, 0) ≤ u (0, 1) < u (m1 − z, 1).
If he chooses b1 = z then there is a tie and let ρ be the probability that he wins the tie. His payoff
will be ρu (m1 − z, 1) + (1− ρ)u (m1, 0) ≤ u (m1 − z, 1) for all ρ ∈ [0, 1]. Hence his best bid is
b1 = m1.
Subcase (iii) z = m1. If he chooses b1 = m1 = z he gets ρu (0, 1) + (1− ρ)u (m1, 0). If he
chooses b1 < m1 = z he gets u (m1, 0). Since m1 ≤ k we have u (m1, 0) ≤ u (0, 1) and hence we
have ρu (0, 1) + (1− ρ)u (m1, 0) ≥ u (m1, 0) for all ρ ∈ [0, 1]. If b1 > z = m1 bidder 1 wins with
certainty but cannot pay for the object after winning it. This means he will default and he has to
pay a positive penalty. Hence for this subcase also b1 = m1 is the best.
Case 2 m1 > k. This means v (m1) = m1 − c (m1). For this case also there are three possible
subcases.
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Subcase (i) z > v (m1). If b1 = v (m1) bidder 1 looses in the auction and gets u (m1, 0). Any
bid b1 < v (m1) gives him the same payoff. Note that as before we can rule out any bid strictly
greater than m1. Hence if z ≥ m1 then bidder 1’s best option is to choose a bid v (m1). If
z < m1 then if b1 ∈ (z,m1] will fetch 1 a payoff equal to u (m1 − z, 1). Since z > v (m1) we have
u (m1 − z, 1) < u (m1 − v (m1) , 1) = u (c (m1) , 1) = u (m1, 0). Hence b1 = v (m1) is better than
b1 ∈ (z,m1]. If b1 = z bidder 1 wins with probability ρ and gets
ρu (m1 − z, 1) + (1− ρ)u (m1, 0)
≤ ρu (m1 − v (m1) , 1) + (1− ρ)u (m1, 0)
= ρu (c (m1) , 1) + (1− ρ)u (m1, 0)
= u (m1, 0) since u (c (m1) , 1) = u (m1, 0) .
Hence for this subcase b1 = v (m1) is the best.
Subcase (ii) z < v (m1). Here if b1 = v (m1) bidder 1 wins in the auction and gets u (m1 − z, 1).
If he chooses b1 ∈ (z, v (m1)) he gets the same payoff. If he chooses b1 < z he looses in the auction
and gets u (m1, 0). Note that since z < v (m1) we have u (m1 − z, 1) > u (m1 − v (m1) , 1) =
u (c (m1) , 1) = u (m1, 0). Hence b1 = v (m1) is strictly better than b1 < z. If b1 = z bidder 1 wins
with probability ρ and gets ρu (m1 − z, 1)+(1− ρ)u (m1, 0) ≤ u (m1 − z, 1) for all ρ ∈ [0, 1]. Hence
for this subcase b1 = v (m1) is the best.
Subcase (iii) z = v (m1). Here if b1 = v (m1) bidder 1 wins in the auction with probability ρ
and gets
ρu (m1 − z, 1) + (1− ρ)u (m1, 0)
= ρu (m1 − v (m1) , 1) + (1− ρ)u (m1, 0)
= ρu (c (m1) , 1) + (1− ρ)u (m1, 0)
= u (m1, 0) since u (c (m1) , 1) = u (m1, 0) .
If he chooses a bid b > z = v (m1) then he wins with certainty and gets
u (m1 − z, 1) = u (m1 − v (m1) , 1) = u (c (m1) , 1) = u (m1, 0) .
If he chooses b1 < z he gets u (m1, 0). Hence b1 = v (m1) is the best bid for bidder 1 in this
subcase.¥
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Proof of Proposition 2 First note that from section 4.1.1 and 4.1.4 we have
Expected revenue (first price auction) RI
=
Z β
α
bI (m) f1 (m) dm
=
1
q
Z β
α
∙
(q − w)m+ s− (q − w)
Fn−1 (m)
Z m
α
Fn−1 (t) dt
¸
f1 (m) dm
=
1
q
∙Z β
α
[(q − w)m+ s] f1 (m) dm− (q − w)
Z β
α
1
Fn−1 (m)
µZ m
α
Fn−1 (t) dt
¶
f1 (m) dm
¸
−− (7)
Also note that Z β
α
[(q − w)m+ s] f1 (m) dm
= (q − w)
Z β
α
mf1 (m) dm+ s−−−− (8) .
We also have
(q − w)
Z β
α
1
Fn−1 (m)
µZ m
α
Fn−1 (t) dt
¶
f1 (m) dm
= (q − w)
Z β
α
1
Fn−1 (m)
µZ m
α
Fn−1 (t) dt
¶
nFn−1 (m) f (m) dm (see section 2.3)
= n (q − w)
Z β
α
µZ m
α
Fn−1 (t) dt
¶
f (m) dm
= n (q − w)
Z β
α
µZ β
t
f (m) dm
¶
Fn−1 (t) dt (by interchanging the order of integration)
= n (q − w)
Z β
α
(1− F (t))Fn−1 (t) dt
= (q − w)
Z β
α
n (1− F (m))Fn−1 (m) dm−−−− (9)
Using (8) and (9) in (7) we get
RI =
1
q
∙
(q − w)
Z β
α
mf1 (m) dm+ s− (q − w)
Z β
α
n (1− F (m))Fn−1 (m) dm
¸
−−− (10)
This means
RI =
(q − w)
q
∙Z β
α
mf1 (m) dm−
Z β
α
n (1− F (m))Fn−1 (m) dm
¸
+
s
q
−−−− (11) .
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Note that
RII =
Z β
α
bII (m) f2 (m) dm
=
Z β
α
(q − w)m+ s
q
f2 (m) dm
=
(q − w)
q
Z β
α
mf2 (m) dm+
s
q
−−−− (12) .
Hence
RI −RII
=
(q −w)
q
∙Z β
α
mf1 (m) dm−
Z β
α
n (1− F (m))Fn−1 (m) dm−
Z β
α
mf2 (m) dm
¸
=
(q −w)
q
∙Z β
α
mdF1 (m)−
Z β
α
n (1− F (m))Fn−1 (m) dm−
Z β
α
mdF2 (m)
¸
=
(q −w)
q
⎡
⎣ [mF1 (m)]
β
α −
R β
α F1 (m) dm−
R β
α n (1− F (m))F
n−1 (m) dm
− [mF2 (m)]βα +
R β
α F2 (m) dm
⎤
⎦
=
(q −w)
q
⎡
⎣ β −
R β
α F
n (m) dm−
R β
α n (1− F (m))Fn−1 (m) dm
−β +
R β
α
£
Fn (m) + nFn−1 (m) (1− F (m))
¤
dm
⎤
⎦
= 0.
Therefore
RI = RII .
Note that
RAP = n
Z β
α
bAP (m) f (m) dm−−−− (13) .
Now from section 4.1.3 we have
bAP (m) =
Fn−1 (m) [(q − w)m+ s]− (q −w)
Rm
α F
n−1 (t) dt
Fn−1 (m) q + (1− Fn−1 (m))w .
Note that q > w and Fn−1 (m) ∈ (0, 1) for all m ∈ [α, β). This means
for all m ∈ [α, β) q > Fn−1 (m) q +
¡
1− Fn−1 (m)
¢
w .
Hence for all m ∈ [α, β)
bAP (m) >
1
q
∙
Fn−1 (m) [(q − w)m+ s]− (q − w)
Z m
α
Fn−1 (t) dt
¸
.
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Using above in (13) we get
RAP >
1
q
Z β
α
∙
Fn−1 (m) [(q − w)m+ s]− (q − w)
Z m
α
Fn−1 (t) dt
¸
nf (m) dm
=
1
q
∙Z β
α
[(q − w)m+ s]nFn−1 (m) f (m) dm− n (q − w)
Z β
α
µZ m
α
Fn−1 (t) dt
¶
f (m) dm
¸
=
1
q
∙Z β
α
[(q − w)m+ s] f1 (m) dm− n (q − w)
Z β
α
µZ m
α
Fn−1 (t) dt
¶
f (m) dm
¸
−−(14).
It may be noted thatZ β
α
µZ m
α
Fn−1 (t) dt
¶
f (m) dm
=
Z β
α
µZ β
t
f (m) dm
¶
Fn−1 (t) dt (changing the order of differentiation).
=
Z β
α
(1− F (t))Fn−1 (t) dt−−−− (15)
Using (15) in (14) we get
RAP >
1
q
∙Z β
α
[(q − w)m+ s] f1 (m) dm− n (q − w)
Z β
α
(1− F (m))Fn−1 (m) dm
¸
= RI (using 8 and 10).
Therefore RAP > RI = RII .¥
Proof of Proposition 3 When r ∈ [0, v (α)) then it makes no difference to the equilibrium
outcome in both first-price auction and second-price auction. That is, r ∈ [0, v (α)) is equivalent to
r = 0. With r = 0 we know that RI = RII (from proposition 2). This implies that RI (r) = RII (r)
for all r ∈ [0, v (α)). We now show that the same is true for r ∈ [v (α) , v (β)].
From section 4.2.4 we know that for all m ∈
h
qr−s
q−w , β
i
P I (m, r) = Fn−1 (m)
(q − w)m+ s
q
− q − w
q
Z m
qr−s
q−w
Fn−1 (t) dt−−−− (16)
Similarly for all m ∈
h
qr−s
q−w , β
i
P II (m, r) = rFn−1
µ
qr − s
q − w
¶
+
Z m
qr−s
q−w
(q − w) z + s
q
dFn−1 (z)−−−− (16a)
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Now since Fn−1 (.) = G (.) we get
P II (m, r) = rG
µ
qr − s
q − w
¶
+
Z m
qr−s
q−w
(q −w) z + s
q
dG (z)
= rG
µ
qr − s
q − w
¶
+
∙
(q −w) z + s
q
G (z)
¸m
qr−s
q−w
−
Z m
qr−s
q−w
G (z) d
µ
(q −w) z + s
q
¶
= rG
µ
qr − s
q − w
¶
+
(q −w)m+ s
q
G (m)− rG
µ
qr − s
q − w
¶
− (q − w)
q
Z m
qr−s
q−w
G (z) dz
=
(q − w)m+ s
q
G (m)− (q − w)
q
Z m
qr−s
q−w
G (z) dz
=
(q − w)m+ s
q
Fn−1 (m)− (q − w)
q
Z m
qr−s
q−w
Fn−1 (z) dz (since Fn−1 (.) = G (.) )
= P I (m, r) (from 16).
We also know (from section 4.2.4) that for r ∈ [v (α) , v (β)]
RI (r) = n
Z β
qr−s
q−w
P I (m, r) f (m) dm
RII (r) = n
Z β
qr−s
q−w
P II (m, r) f (m) dm
Since we have just shown that P I (m, r) = P II (m, r) for all r ∈ [v (α) , v (β)], we get that RI (r) =
RII (r) for all r ∈ [v (α) , v (β)] . At the begining of the proof we have already shown that RI (r) =
RII (r) for all r ∈ [0, v (α)).¥
Proof of Proposition 4 First note that for any r ∈ [0, v (α)) , RI (r) is same as RI (0). And so
r ∈ [0, v (α)) we have d
dr
RI (r) = 0.
For r ∈ (v (β) ,∞) we have RI (r) = 0 (since no bidder will make any bid for such a r).
For r ∈ [v (α) , v (β)] we have
d
dr
RI (r) =
d
dr
"
n
Z β
qr−s
q−w
P I (m, r) f (m) dm
#
= n
"
− q
q − wP
I
µ
qr − s
q −w , r
¶
f
µ
qr − s
q − w
¶
+
Z β
qr−s
q−w
∂
∂r
¡
P I (m, r)
¢
f (m) dm
#
−−− (17) .
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Now
P I
µ
qr − s
q − w , r
¶
= Fn−1
µ
qr − s
q − w
¶ (q − w)³qr−sq−w ´+ s
q
= rFn−1
µ
qr − s
q − w
¶
−−−− (18)
And
∂
∂r
¡
P I (m, r)
¢
=
∂
∂r
"
Fn−1 (m)
(q − w)m+ s
q
− q − w
q
Z m
qr−s
q−w
Fn−1 (t) dt
#
=
q − w
q
× q
q − wF
n−1
µ
qr − s
q − w
¶
= Fn−1
µ
qr − s
q − w
¶
−−−− (19) .
Using (18) and (19) in (17) we get that
d
dr
RI (r) = n
"
− q
q − wrF
n−1
µ
qr − s
q − w
¶
f
µ
qr − s
q − w
¶
+
Z β
qr−s
q−w
Fn−1
µ
qr − s
q − w
¶
f (m) dm
#
= n
"
− q
q − wrF
n−1
µ
qr − s
q − w
¶
f
µ
qr − s
q − w
¶
+ Fn−1
µ
qr − s
q − w
¶Z β
qr−s
q−w
f (m) dm
#
= n
∙
− q
q − wrF
n−1
µ
qr − s
q − w
¶
f
µ
qr − s
q − w
¶
+ Fn−1
µ
qr − s
q − w
¶µ
1− F
µ
qr − s
q − w
¶¶¸
= nFn−1
µ
qr − s
q −w
¶µ
1− F
µ
qr − s
q − w
¶¶⎡
⎣−
µ
qr
q − w
¶⎛
⎝
f
³
qr−s
q−w
´
1− F
³
qr−s
q−w
´
⎞
⎠+ 1
⎤
⎦−− (20) .
Since f(z)1−F (z) is non-decreasing in z and f (α) ≥
q−w
(q−w)α+swe have
f
³
qr−s
q−w
´
1− F
³
qr−s
q−w
´ ≥ f (α)
1− F (α) = f (α) ≥
q − w
(q − w)α+ s −−− (21) .
Now
r ∈ [v (α) , v (β)]⇒ r ≥ (q − w)α+ s
q
−−−− (22) .
Using (21) and (22) we get that for r ∈ [v (α) , v (β)]µ
qr
q − w
¶⎛
⎝
f
³
qr−s
q−w
´
1− F
³
qr−s
q−w
´
⎞
⎠ ≥
⎡
⎣
q
³
(q−w)α+s
q
´
q − w
⎤
⎦
µ
q − w
(q −w)α+ s
¶
= 1−−−− (23) .
Using (23) in (20) we get that ddrR
I (r) ≤ 0 for all r ∈ [v (α) , v (β)]. Note that RI (r) = RI (0) for
all r ∈ [0, v (α)). This implies that r∗ (FPA) = 0. Since RI (r) = RII (r) for all r ∈ [0, v (β)] (from
proposition 3) we also get that r∗ (SPA) = 0.
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To compute r∗ (APA) note the following. From section 4.2.3 we know that if r ∈ [0, v (β)] then
bAP (m) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
{No} if m ∈ [α, µ)
Fn−1(m)[(q−w)m+s]−(q−w)
?m
µ F
n−1(t)dt
Fn−1(m)q+(1−Fn−1(m))w if m ∈ [µ, β]
where µ is s.t. Fn−1 (µ) [(q − w (µ− r) + s] = wr.
As noted in section 4.2.4, in an all-pay auction the expected payment,PAP (m, r), of a bidder
with income m ≥ µ is just bAP (m). That is,
PAP (m, r) =
Fn−1 (m) [(q −w)m+ s]− (q − w)
Rm
µ F
n−1 (t) dt
Fn−1 (m) q + (1− Fn−1 (m))w −−−− (24) .
The expected revenue for any r ∈ [0, v (β)] is as follows.
RAP (r) = n
Z β
µ
PAP (m, r) f (m) dm
Hence
d
dr
RAP (r) = n
∙
−dµ
dr
PAP (µ, r) f (µ) +
Z β
µ
∂
∂r
¡
PAP (m, r)
¢
f (m) dm
¸
−−−− (25)
Note that
PAP (µ, r) f (µ) =
Fn−1 (µ) [(q − w)µ+ s] f (µ)
Fn−1 (µ) q + (1− Fn−1 (µ))w −−−− (26)
Also
∂
∂r
¡
PAP (m, r)
¢
=
(q − w) dµdrFn−1 (µ)
Fn−1 (m) q + (1− Fn−1 (m))w −−−− (27)
Note that since since q > w and µ ≤ m we get
Fn−1 (µ) q +
¡
1− Fn−1 (µ)
¢
w ≤ Fn−1 (m) q +
¡
1− Fn−1 (m)
¢
w.
Using the above in (27) we have
∂
∂r
¡
PAP (m, r)
¢
≤
(q − w) dµdrFn−1 (µ)
Fn−1 (µ) q + (1− Fn−1 (µ))w −−−− (28)
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Using (26) and (28) in (25) we get
d
dr
RAP (r) ≤ n
"
−dµ
dr
Fn−1 (µ) [(q − w)µ+ s] f (µ)
Fn−1 (µ) q + (1− Fn−1 (µ))w +
R β
µ (q − w)
dµ
drF
n−1 (µ) f (m) dm
Fn−1 (µ) q + (1− Fn−1 (µ))w
#
=
nFn−1 (µ) dµdr
Fn−1 (µ) q + (1− Fn−1 (µ))w
∙
− [(q − w)µ+ s] f (µ) + (q −w)
Z β
µ
f (m) dm
¸
=
nFn−1 (µ) dµdr
Fn−1 (µ) q + (1− Fn−1 (µ))w [− [(q − w)µ+ s] f (µ) + (q − w) (1− F (µ))]
=
nFn−1 (µ) dµdr (1− F (µ))
Fn−1 (µ) q + (1− Fn−1 (µ))w
∙
− [(q −w)µ+ s] f (µ)
1− F (µ) + (q − w)
¸
−−−− (29) .
From section 4.2.3 note that since µ is s.t. Fn−1 (µ) [(q − w (µ− r) + s] = wr, we have µ ≥ α
and dµdr ≥ 0. Also, it is given that
f(z)
1−F (z) is non-decreasing in z and f (α) ≥
q−w
(q−w)α+s . So we get
[(q −w)µ+ s] f (µ)
1− F (µ) ≥
[(q − w)α+ s] f (α)
1− F (α)
= [(q − w)α+ s] f (α)
≥ (q − w)−−−− (30)
Hence from (29) and (30) we get ddrR
AP (r) ≤ 0. This implies r∗ (APA) = 0.¥
Proof of Proposition 5 Let bidders 2, 3...n bid m2,m3...mn. Bidder 1’s income is m1 and he
chooses a bid equal to b1. Then bidder 1’s expected payoff is
π1 (b1,m1) = G (b1)u (m1 − b1, 1) + (1−G (b1))u (m1, 0) .
Then
∂π1 (.)
∂b1
= g (b1) [u (m1 − b1, 1)− u (m1, 0)]−G (b1)u0 (m1 − b1, 1)−− (31) .
First consider the case where m1 = α. From remark 1 in section 2.2.1 we know that in any
symmetric equilibrium b1 ≤ m1. Since m1 = α we have b1 ≤ α. And for all b1 ∈ [0, α] we have
G (b1) = 0 and u (m1 − b1, 1) − u (m1, 0) > 0. Therefore the best possible bid when m1 = α is
b1 = α. That is, bI (α) = α.
Now consider the case where m1 > α. If bidder 1 chooses b1 = α, then
∂π1(.)
∂b1
> 0. Hence for
this case b1 > α. From (31) we can write
∂π1(.)
∂b1
as follows (note that G (b1) > 0 for b1 > α) .
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∂π1 (.)
∂b1
= G (b1)
∙
g (b1)
G (b1)
[u (m1 − b1, 1)− u (m1, 0)]− u0 (m1 − b1, 1)
¸
= G (b1)
∙
(n− 1) f (b1)
F (b1)
[u (m1 − b1, 1)− u (m1, 0)]− u0 (m1 − b1, 1)
¸
−− (32) .
The above follows because
g (b1)
G (b1)
= (n− 1) f (b1)
F (b1)
.
Since b1 ≤ m1 and since the reverse hazard rate f(b1)F (b1) is non-increasing we have
(n− 1) f (b1)
F (b1)
≥ (n− 1) f (m1)
F (m1)
.
Since u (.) is strictly increasing in x we have for all b1 < m1, u (m1 − b1, 1) > u (0, 1) and since
m1 ∈ (α, β] we have u (m1, 0) ≤ u (β, 0). This implies
(n− 1) f (b1)
F (b1)
[u (m1 − b1, 1)− u (m1, 0)]
> (n− 1) f (m1)
F (m1)
[u (0, 1)− u (β, 0)]
≥ (n− 1) f (β) [u (0, 1)− u (β, 0)]
≥ u0 (x, 1) for all x ∈ [0, β] (as per the hypothesis of the proposition).
Using the above in (32) we get that when m1 ∈ (α, β], ∂π1(.)∂b1 > 0 for all b1 < m1. Therefore the
best bid is b1 = m1. That is, bI (m1) = m1.¥
Proof of Proposition 6 Let bidders 2, 3...n bid m2,m3...mn. Bidder 1’s income is m1 and he
chooses a bid equal to b1. Then bidder 1’s expected payoff is
π1 (b1,m1) = G (b1)u (m1 − b1, 1) + (1−G (b1))u (m1 − b1, 0)
= Fn−1 (b1)u (m1 − b1, 1) +
¡
1− Fn−1 (b1)
¢
u (m1 − b1, 0) .
If bidder 1 chooses b1 = m1 his expected payoff is Fn−1 (b1)u (0, 1). If he chooses not to bid then
he gets u (m1, 0). If he chooses a bid strictly less than m1 he chooses b1 = m1−ε where ε ∈ (0,m1).
Then his expected payoff is
Fn−1 (m1 − ε)u (ε, 1) +
¡
1− Fn−1 (m1 − ε)
¢
u (ε, 0) .
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Since ∀mi ∈ [0, β] we have (by the hypotheses of the proposition)
Fn−1 (mi)u (0, 1) ≥ u (mi, 0)
and Fn−1 (mi)u (0, 1) ≥ Fn−1 (mi − ε)u (ε, 1) +
¡
1− Fn−1 (mi − ε)
¢
u (ε, 0) , ∀ε ∈ (0,mi)
choosing b1 = m1 is optimal.¥
Proof of Proposition 7 The expected revenues in this case are as follows.
First-price : RI =
Z β
0
zf1 (z) dz =
Z β
0
zdF1 (z)
Second-price : RII =
Z β
0
zf2 (z) dz =
Z β
0
zdF2 (z)
All-Pay : RAP = n
Z β
0
zf (z) dz
First note that F1 (z) = Fn (z) and F2 (z) = Fn (z) + nFn−1 (z) (1− F (z)). Since F1 (z) < F2 (z)
for all z ∈ (α, β) we have RI > RII .
Also note that
RI =
Z β
0
zf1 (z) dz = n
Z β
0
zFn−1 (z) f (z) dz
< n
Z β
0
zf (z) dz (since Fn−1 (z) < 1 for all z ∈ [0, β) )
= RAP .
Hence we have RAP > RI > RII .¥
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